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The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
Time to End the Corporate Welfare
by Robert J. Rhee

Executive Summary
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
inflicted enormous losses on the insurance industry and businesses. In the wake of the disruptions occurring in the insurance market at
the time, the government enacted the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 to create a “temporary” federal backstop against catastrophic losses. This program subsidized private risk with
public funds through a cost-sharing program
for which the government does not receive any
compensation.
The compelling need for the program was
unclear even in the smoldering aftermath of
9/11. Yet in response to effective lobbying by the
insurance industry and business interests, Con-

gress has twice extended the program. The program is now scheduled to sunset at the end of
2014, 12 years after this supposedly temporary
program was instituted.
If there was some ambiguity about the program’s need before, there is none now. Terrorism
risk is not more severe than other insurable risks
such as natural catastrophes, and a federal backstop stakes public money to protect the insurance industry, and subsidize the terrorism risk
insurance premiums for commercial policyholders. The private market is capable of underwriting this risk. This policy analysis suggests that
the program should sunset as scheduled in 2014,
thus ending this form of corporate welfare.

Robert J. Rhee is professor of law and Marbury Research Professor at the University of Maryland Francis King
Carey School of Law, where he is co-director of the business law program, and professor (courtesy) at the Johns
Hopkins Carey Business School.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330592

The insurance
market is capable
of providing
terrorism risk
coverage without
a federal loss
backstop.

Introduction

The conventional wisdom in the insurance industry before 9/11 was that terrorism
posed a discrete risk of low-intensity, highvisibility violence, such as the 1972 Munich
Olympics and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
103. Losses were measured in millions of dollars at worst, and lives lost in the relatively
few. In this respect, the recent 2013 Boston
Marathon bombing is consistent with this
thesis of terrorism. The actuarial and pricing
models for much of the 20th century did not
consider terrorism as an extraordinary risk
requiring exclusion or additional premium in
the vein of nuclear contamination, war loss,
or even earthquake loss. Insurers covered terrorism risk in most “all risk” policies, and
reinsurers (entities that act as insurers for insurance companies) did not carve out the risk
in their treaties. The risk was perceived to be
so small that it was covered for “free.”4
This pricing model continued as terrorism slowly evolved into a major problem
over the course of several decades. The 1990s
introduced the era of catastrophic terrorism,
with the phenomenon first taking root in
Europe. The first truly catastrophic terrorist act occurred when the Irish Republican
Army bombed London on April 21, 1992,
causing $671 million in insurance losses.
The industry recognized then that terrorism
posed a catastrophic risk. In a prescient assessment, Swiss Re stated in 1993, “A single
bomb attack can kill thousands of people,
cause several billion dollars of damage, and
paralyse entire branches of industry . . .
[and] lay entire cities to waste.”5 Although
9/11 was unprecedented as a manifestation
of extreme risk, it did not beget a new awareness of the risk. Scholars and policymakers
had warned of such risks before, and industry leaders were aware, at least abstractly, of
the potentially massive exposure to terrorism long before 9/11.6
Before 9/11, losses from terrorism were
not on the scale that would threaten a whole
economy or pose a systemic danger to the
insurance system and business enterprises.
But the insurance industry knew that liability could extend into the billions of dollars.

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002, as amended and extended by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2005 and the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 (together referred to as
TRIA), was initiated in the wake of the shocking September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in
New York City and Washington, D.C. TRIA
is scheduled to sunset on December 31,
2014. Should the program be reauthorized?
I have previously written that the commercial insurance and reinsurance markets
are sophisticated, well resourced, and well
capitalized, and that government intrusion
into the workings of these markets through
TRIA was unwarranted.1 The insurance industry absorbed the 9/11 losses and recapitalized lost capital, setting the stage for development of a market for terrorism risk and
industry growth. In 2013, 12 years after the
dislocations of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, insurers and businesses should fully bear the
cost of terrorism-related losses instead of
externalizing catastrophic loss to the public fisc. The insurance market is capable of
providing terrorism risk coverage without
a federal loss backstop. Even an event like
9/11, which was extreme and unexpected,
did not cause systemic insolvency crisis in
the insurance market. Since insurers and private industry can shoulder their own losses,
government financial support is an unwarranted subsidy for insurers and commercial
policyholders.
The 9/11 Attacks and Aftermath
The 9/11 terrorist attacks were unprecedented in several ways. The terrorists strategically targeted the world’s most important
commercial and political centers. They killed
2,976 people, displaced 1,025 businesses employing more than 75,000 people, disrupted
another 18,000 businesses employing 563,000
people,2 and inflicted about $23 billion in insured losses.3 Along with Hurricane Andrew,
the 9/11 attacks stood at the time as the largest insurance loss arising from a single event.
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If it had critically analyzed the data, the inevitable conclusion would have been that
catastrophic losses would continue and that
both frequency and severity could substantially increase beyond the linear extrapolations of past experience of low-intensity
violence. With 9/11, this theoretical possibility of catastrophic risk metastasized into a
paradigm-shifting problem for the industry,
national economy, and government.
Importantly, while the losses from 9/11
were extreme, the event did not truly test the
solvency of the industry. Whereas Hurricane
Andrew in 1992 resulted in the bankruptcies of 12 small insurers,7 9/11 did not have
the same effect on the industry. Few insurers became troubled as a result of the losses.
Reinsurers absorbed a bulk of the losses, and
since 9/11 the insurance industry has recapitalized, and the financial health of the sector
is now stronger than it was then.

curtailing coverage, or—as we have already
seen with terrorism risk exclusions—simply
refusing to offer the coverage.”10
After an industry shock, the first to exit
are reinsurers. Reinsurance provides additional capital to insurers and thus increases
insurers’ underwriting capacity. Because reinsurers are unregulated, they can enter and
exit markets freely. In the case of 9/11, reinsurers bore the brunt of the losses. When a
majority of the reinsurance treaties came up
for renewal in January 2002, they were not
renewed as to terrorism coverage.
Without reinsurance, insurers could not
limit the exposure to severe liability and felt
compelled to exclude coverage. Their exit
from the terrorism insurance market, however, was slowed by regulatory constraints.
The new exclusion filed with state regulators
broadly defined terrorism and limited coverage to losses of $25 million or less.11 It placed
terrorism risk squarely on the shoulders of
business and corporate policyholders and
their financiers. In addition to reduced capacity, 9/11 accelerated a “price-hardening”
cycle. Post-9/11 prices increased significantly12 and some insurers cherry-picked underwriting risks at greatly increased prices.13
Reduced capacity and increased prices
led to an inability to transfer risk. Unless required, for example, by financial covenants
in debt instruments or other financial transactions, few policyholders bought terrorism
coverage. The new pricing of terrorism coverage and cost-benefit perceptions of policyholders led to perceived adverse selection.14
Those perceived to be most at risk (e.g., policyholders and financiers of trophy properties) were the most likely to purchase terrorism coverage, if such coverage was available,
while lower-risk policyholders chose to forgo
it. The greatest risk of terrorism was transferred, albeit selectively, to the industry,
which could not sufficiently diversify this
risk because of the low “take up” by lowerrisk insureds who may have been priced out
of the market.
The problem was that the insurance
mechanism was unavailable when policy-

Immediate Aftereffect on the Insurance
Market
In response to the attacks, insurers announced that they would not invoke the
war loss exclusion—which, if successfully invoked, would have relieved them from paying
damages on a loss from an act of war—with
the caveat that they would dispute ordinary
coverage issues. In the same breath, however,
they indicated that terrorism risk would be
excluded in the future.8 This was consistent
with history. The industry reacts to a shock
by withdrawing from the market. The last
such shocks were Hurricane Andrew and the
Northridge earthquake in 1994, which precipitated a withdrawal from the market by
reinsurers. This in turn led to dramatic price
increases in the short term.9 But as the industry recapitalized, the market eventually went
into a “soft” price cycle—in which premiums
fell and coverage expanded—for much of the
1990s. Then–treasury secretary Paul O’Neill
best summarized the situation with 9/11
this way: “Because insurance companies do
not know the upper bound of terrorism risk
exposure, they will protect themselves by
charging enormous premiums, dramatically
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While the losses
from 9/11 were
extreme, the
event did not
truly test the
solvency of the
industry.

or otherwise suppress economic activity.18
Congress found that the federal government
should provide a temporary cost-sharing
scheme while the private market figures out
a way to deal with terrorism risk.19 Based on
those findings, Congress enacted TRIA to assure “widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk,” and to “allow for a transitional
period for the private markets to stabilize,
resume pricing of such insurance, and build
capacity to absorb any future losses.”20
TRIA established a temporary federal reinsurance program—a “backstop” for large
losses from terrorism. It is a public-private
cost-sharing arrangement. Unlike private reinsurance, the government funds losses per
a statutory formula, but it does not collect
premiums or develop a reserve prior to the
occurrence of an event.
Because TRIA was intended to be a temporary stabilization measure, it was enacted
with a sunset date of December 31, 2005. Before that sunset, and in response to lobbying
from insurance and business interests, the
government extended the program through
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act
of 2005,21 which extended TRIA for two
years and modified some of its key terms.
Before sunset of the 2005 act, the program
was again modified and extended for another seven years under the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of
2007.22 TRIA now has a sunset date of December 31, 2014.23

holders sought to transfer some of the risk
in the ordinary course of corporate risk management. There was either no coverage or exorbitant prices. Because there was a temporary dislocation of supply and demand, the
economy began to suffer. High premiums
had trickle-down effects on the rest of the
economy. Increases in financing costs led to
a higher cost of goods and services, resulting in higher prices and reduced profits. The
real estate and financing industries were hit
the hardest. The lack of coverage and higher
premiums increased the cost of capital and
restricted capital flow to the real estate and
construction sectors. Commercial mortgagebacked securities saw a decline in overall
credit rating and prices, and borrowers faced
the possibility of default and loan recalls
because of covenants requiring insurance
coverage. Lenders were reluctant to finance
billions of dollars of construction projects
without terrorism coverage.
In short, 9/11 caused substantial shortterm economic damage on a national level.
The insurance market was perceived to be
unstable in the short-term, causing price and
capacity dislocation, adverse selection of risk,
concentrated risk, economic slowdown, and
significant job losses. In the midst of this perceived temporary economic turbulence, the
government enacted the original TRIA law.

TRIA
Because TRIA
was intended to
be a temporary
stabilization
measure, it was
enacted with a
sunset date of
December 31,
2005.

On November 26, 2002, the original TRIA
legislation was signed into law.15 In enacting
TRIA, Congress found that the market could
not support “reasonable and predictable
prices” because 9/11 hindered the normal
risk-spreading function of insurance,16 and
this dysfunction adversely affected economic
growth and development. The insurance and
financial markets faced “widespread financial market uncertainties,” including significant actuarial data and methods to properly
allocate risk and loss.17 The withdrawal of insurance from the market and substantial premium increases could seriously undermine

Current Structure of TRIA
The U.S. secretary of the treasury administers the TRIA program, and is vested with
the power to issue interim and final rules
and procedures for its administration.24
Coverage begins when the secretary certifies
a loss caused by an “act of terrorism.” The
secretary cannot certify an act if the aggregate insurance losses comprise less than $5
million.25 TRIA defines an act of terrorism
as (1) “a violent act or an act that is dangerous to human life; property; or infrastructure; to have resulted in damage within the
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United States, or outside the United States
in the case of an air carrier or vessel,” and (2)
“to have been committed by an individual
or individuals, as part of an effort to coerce
the civilian population of the United States
or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by
coercion.”26 The definition of terrorism is
rooted in past experience of violent acts typically in the form of bombings, hijackings,
killings, and other acts of destruction. The
definition covers the damage or destruction
to life or property from a physical force.
In the original version of TRIA, a terrorist
was defined as a person “acting on behalf of a
foreign person or foreign interest.” The 2007
act deleted this definitional component. The
program now can encompass acts of domestic terrorism conducted by American citizens
or residents and does not require that the act
be committed “on behalf” of a foreign person or interest. This revised definition may
be relevant for cases like the April 15, 2013,
Boston Marathon bombing in which there
appears, as of the writing of this policy analysis, to be no direct connection to a foreign
terror sponsor. This was a broad expansion
of the program, which initially sought to
address the risk from radical Islamic terrorist organizations. TRIA now provides broad
coverage for any violent act in furtherance of
civilian coercion or policy influence.
The program has two important mandates. First, insurers covered by TRIA “shall
participate in the Program.”27 The program is
mandatory as to statutorily defined insurers,28
primarily commercial property and casualty
insurers. Second, TRIA requires insurers to
“make available” terrorism coverage to policyholders under terms and premium pricing
that do “not differ materially from the terms,
amounts, and other coverage limitations” applicable for other risks. 29 While insurers must
make coverage available, TRIA does not mandate that the insured must purchase terrorism
insurance. The participation and “make available” mandates negate the terrorism exclusions filed and issued in the immediate wake
of 9/11. In return, the federal government

bears a substantial portion of losses from terrorism in a cost-sharing scheme.
TRIA has a loss trigger. No compensation
will be paid by the treasury secretary unless
the aggregate industry insured loss from a certified act of terrorism exceeds $100 million.30
This loss trigger is sufficiently large to exclude
from the program most violent acts aimed
primarily at human targets, such as suicide
bombings or random car bombings. Against
commercial targets, however, the $100 million loss trigger is a very low threshold since
the value of a single commercial building or
asset can readily exceed that amount. September 11 was the first billion-dollar attack, but it
was not the first catastrophic terrorist attack.
In the recent history of terrorism, there have
been a number of events that have exceeded
$100 million in losses.31 The bombing of a
single commercial airliner could easily exceed
$100 million in losses.
Upon trigger, there is an “insurer deductible,” which is “the value of an insurer’s direct earned premiums over the calendar
year immediately preceding [the] Program
Year.”32 TRIA sets forth different deductible amounts for different program years. In
years 2013 and 2014, the insurer’s deductible
is 20 percent of the value of an insurer’s direct earned premiums over the calendar year
immediately preceeding the program year.33
Beyond the insurer’s deductible, TRIA
provides for a cost-sharing arrangement.34
In years 2013 and 2014, the federal government’s obligation to compensate is 85 percent of “that portion of the amount of such
insured losses that exceeds the applicable
insurer deductible required to be paid” during the specific program year.35 The insurer
is responsible for the remaining 15 percent
of losses exceeding the deductible.
The federal government’s obligation to
compensate and the insurer’s liability for
terrorism losses are capped at the aggregate
insured losses level of $100 billion.36 TRIA
also caps the loss exposure of insurers, providing that “no insurer that has met [its] insurer deductible shall be liable for payment
of any portion of the amount of such losses
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There are no
compelling
reasons to
provide yet
another extension
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that exceeds [$100 billion].”37 The treasury
secretary determines the pro rata share of
insured losses to be paid by each insurer
that incurs insured losses, except that “no
insurer may be required to make any payment for insured losses in excess of its deductible under [TRIA] section 102(7) combined with its share of insured losses [the 15
percent co-pay set forth in TRIA § 103(e)(1)
(A)].”38 Thus, once the program is triggered
by losses of more than $100 million, the insurer’s exposure is limited to its deductible
plus co-pay.
Once the federal government provides
compensation, TRIA requires a mandatory
recoupment amount. The mandatory recoupment amount is the difference between
(1) the insurance marketplace aggregate retention amount as determined by the statute,39 and (2) the aggregate amount, for all
insurers, of insured losses that the federal
government does not compensate because
such losses are within the insurer deductible, or the portion of losses of the insurer’s
co-pay amount.40 There is no mandatory recoupment if uncompensated losses exceed
the aggregate retention.41
The treasury secretary must collect repayment of the mandatory recoupment
through “terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums in an amount equal to 133 percent
of any mandatory recoupment amount for
such period.”42 The 133 percent multiplier
is intended to neutralize the lost tax revenue
when policyholders deduct the surcharges
on their corporate taxes.
If the federal government’s payment exceeds any mandatory recoupment amount,
the treasury secretary may recoup, through
terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums, additional amounts based on the following
factors:43

ance for small and medium-sized businesses
●● other factors that the secretary may
deem relevant.
Any recoupment amount is collected as a terrorism loss risk-spreading premium.44 This
surcharge premium is imposed on property
and casualty insurance policies in force after
the date the surcharge is established and is
based on the percentage of premium amount
charged under the policy for the property and
casualty coverage.45
Purpose of TRIA
In determining whether TRIA should be
reauthorized beyond the 2014 sunset, it is
important that policymakers consider the
legislation’s explicitly stated purpose. It was
enacted as a temporary market stabilization
measure, with an original sunset date of December 31, 2005:
The purpose of this title is to establish
a temporary Federal program that
provides for a transparent system of
shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting
from acts of terrorism, in order to
(1) protect consumers by addressing
market disruptions and ensure the
continued widespread availability and
affordability of property and casualty
insurance for terrorism risk; and (2)
allow for a transitional period for the
private market to stabilize, resume
pricing of such insurance, and build
capacity to absorb any future losses,
while preserving State insurance regulation and consumer protection.46
Based on the above statement of purpose,
as of the writing of this policy analysis, the
rationale for TRIA has run its course. There
are no compelling reasons to provide yet another extension of the program beyond the
December 31, 2014, sunset, which is 12 years
after TRIA’s enactment and 9 years after its
original sunset date.

●● TRIA’s ultimate cost to taxpayers
●● the economic conditions in the commercial marketplace, including factors
indicating the financial health of the
insurance industry
●● the affordability of commercial insur-
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The Market for
Terrorism Risk

ed that the insurance industry should not
cover natural catastrophes or that they are
uninsurable.
Information is vital. Without good data
and reliable modeling, premiums must incorporate a substantial markup to ensure
proper reserving for losses. The study of terrorism and collection of data have become
top priorities of government, think tanks,
and sophisticated members of the industry. Insurers are continuing to develop riskfactor models and methodologies to better
assess terrorism risk. Human motivations
and planning of attacks, intended to be unpredictable, are difficult to model with actuarial rigor.47 However, patterns of terrorism
already are evident in the data. Consider,
for example, the commonly asserted claim
that terrorism risk is different from natural
catastrophes because it can strike anywhere
as opposed to the geographic limitation of
some natural catastrophes. While this may
be true, it is an unpersuasive argument in
terms of the economic consequences of terrorism. Even the most cursory review of the
unrefined data shows that most of the costliest catastrophes struck London, New York,
and the airline industry.
High-value economic targets tend to be
concentrated in certain geographic areas,
whether they be cities, industrial zones, certain industries, or specific assets. An attack
in downtown Topeka, while possibly devastating, will have a markedly different impact
on the economy than an attack of the same
scale in Manhattan, and the same applies for
an attack on an Amtrak train as opposed to a
commercial airline. The tragedy of 9/11 has
many dimensions, of course, but one striking aspect is that high-value economic targets such as New York and the World Trade
Center were considered “soft” targets prior
to 9/11. With the realization that terrorists
have targeted high-value economic assets,
security around those assets has increased
significantly. Many of those properties are
no longer “soft” targets. Major cities, ports
of entry, and economic assets like factories,
dams, and skyscrapers have increased their

Two primary arguments have been made
to suggest that terrorism risk is unique and
therefore should be a subject to a government compensation program:
●● The risk can be extreme.
●● The risk is unpredictable in the sense
that it is not capable of assessment.
These issues are related. Because the keystone
concept in insurance is the law of large numbers, insurance works best when frequency is
high and severity is relatively low, e.g., auto,
home, and life insurance. When frequency is
low and severity is high, as is the case in both
man-made and natural catastrophes, assessibility of risk is problematic and insurability
is tested. Assessibility considers whether the
risk—both frequency and severity—can be
quantified, and this factor is perceived by
many to be the most significant problem.
Terrorism is similar to natural catastrophes in that it is random and involves low
frequency but potentially high severity. The
key difference is that long-term historical data exist for some kinds of repeating
natural catastrophes and their catastrophic
patterns are generally localized to specific
geographic areas, for example, hurricanes
in Florida and earthquakes in California.
However, terrorism, while unpredictable to a
degree, is also not random. Virtually all terrorist acts in the past have been low-severity
events. The 9/11 attack was an outlier, and
the possibility of such events recurring in the
future, while tangible, has become more remote with the awareness 9/11 brought and
the countermeasures that were subsequently
implemented. Only a few spectacular acts
will cause widespread losses. In this regard,
terrorism is very much akin to natural catastrophes in frequency and severity. In the context of the 20th century, 9/11 was a one-in100-year event. Natural catastrophes on par
with 9/11 are equally rare and in some cases
equally inaccessible. Yet, no one has suggest-
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security. In response to the changes, terrorists have recently shifted their strategy toward other soft target opportunities, a process that confirms the dynamic uncertainty
of containing terrorism. Post-9/11 soft target attacks have included the bombings in
Bali, Indonesia, and the Madrid train system;
the killing of school children in Beslan, Russia; and even the Boston Marathon bombing.
These attacks combine random killings and
shocking inhumanity. Albeit horrific, they
do not pose a catastrophic economic problem.
To the extent that soft targets are attacked,
insurance as a risk management technique
can adequately handle the economics of human loss and tragedy.
There will never be a day in which terrorism risk can be calculated to an actuarial
certainty like auto or life insurance. Modeling terrorism risk is probably more difficult
to do than modeling natural catastrophes
because there has not been long-term experience or enormous scientific knowledge
accompanying the study of terrorism. Significant uncertainty will always surround
terrorism risk. But it is a mistake to believe
that uncertainty equates to inaccessibility. In
addressing the insurability of mega-catastrophes like the South Asia tsunami, Swiss Re
took the following position:

comes categorically uninsurable without the
backing of the public fisc.
Terrorism risk can be extreme, but no
more so than the risk of many different kinds
of natural catastrophes that can strike a major urban or commercial area where there is a
concentration of insured interests. The argument that terrorism risk is so fundamentally
different and thus uninsurable is self-serving
and reflects more a lobbying strategy than
actuarial reality. “Terrorism coverage may be
quantitatively different, but it is not qualitatively different.”49
Since 9/11, there has not been another
major terrorist attack in the geographic
United States. During this time, the insurance industry has recovered much of its losses through the premiums charged to cover
terrorism risk. No one knows when the next
major terrorist strike will occur, perhaps this
year or perhaps 10 years from now, but when
it occurs there certainly will have been many
years of premium collection and the building up of reserves. Whether that reserve is
sufficient to pay the loss is unknown, but
this is also a part of the business of insurance—no one ever promised the insurance
industry a guaranteed profit or solvency. The
fundamental business of insurance is to assume risk.

Even tsunamis or yet more extreme
events such as meteorite impacts are
insurable, subject to certain reservations. They cannot yet be modeled in
such detail as other natural hazards,
for instance earthquakes or tropical
cyclones, but it is possible to quantify
the risks with sufficient accuracy to
design expedient insurance cover, and
to spread the risk worldwide via the
established reinsurance system.48

Further Perspective on Catastrophic Terrorism Risk
TRIA is based on the premise that terrorism risk is somehow unique among classes
of risk because the potential magnitude of
the loss is so much greater than other catastrophic risks. Data suggest that this is not
true. Terrorism risk can manifest into catastrophic losses in the tens of billions of dollars, but the insurance industry and policyholders are routinely exposed to a multitude
of mega-catastrophic risks. The following
data on the insurance industry’s catastrophic losses were compiled by Swiss Re and published in its research journal Sigma.50 (Note:
unless otherwise stated, all figures are reported in dollar values as of the date of the
loss and are unadjusted for time.)

If the devastation from a meteorite strike
is insurable, what elevates terrestrial terrorism to that rarified level of uninsurability?
Insurance is fundamentally a risk-taking
industry, and there is nothing so uniquely
compelling about terrorism risk that it be-
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With respect to terrorism, U.S. insurance losses after 9/11 have been relatively
minimal. The aggregate losses in the years
2003–2012 from terrorism are $433 million.
In comparison, U.S. insurance losses for
“social unrest” during the same time period
were almost double the terrorism amount:
$837 million. Losses from “accidental manmade disasters” were more than 100 times
the terrorism amount: $45,690 million.
The losses from natural catastrophe were
more than a thousand times the terrorism
losses: $463,559 million. (Storms alone were
$310,775 million.) Those numbers are detailed in Table 1. Yet insurers have covered
nonterrorism losses without a comprehensive federal backstop.
Another comparison that puts terrorism risk in perspective is a list of the top 20
worldwide catastrophic losses incurred by
the insurance industry from the years 1970
to 2012. Those numbers are shown in Table
2. Notice that 9/11 is the only man-made
event that makes the list of the top 20 insurance losses from catastrophes.

The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that terrorism losses can far exceed the billion-dollar
threshold. However, there is little doubt that
in the long term terrorism pales in comparison to natural catastrophes in frequency, severity, and aggregate loss. The greatest risk of
exogenous shock threatening the solvency of
the industry is from a natural mega-catastrophe.51 With global warming and the resulting increase in the frequency and severity of
storms, losses from storms pose far greater
expected aggregate losses than terrorism.
Note that 10 of the top 20 catastrophic losses in Table 2 are weather-related losses occurring after the year 2000. So what is more
likely—an entire city destroyed by a storm
or a terrorist attack? Yet, neither storms nor
earthquakes are subject to broad coverage
benefits provided by the federal government.
The magnitude of a single event and the aggregate potential losses do not distinguish
terrorism risk from other catastrophic risks.
This is not to diminish terrorism risk as a
class of catastrophic risk, but neither is it to
raise terrorism risk as the supreme specter.

Table 1
U.S. Insurance Losses by Category, 2003–2012 ($ millions)

Year

Terrorism
($ millions)

Accidental
Man-made
Disasters ($ millions)

Natural
Catastrophes
($ millions)

Storms
($ millions)

2003

0

2,320

16,170

8,326

2004

0

2,889

45,737

38,175

2005

52.00

5,056

78,330

73,512

2006

69.00

4,043

11,838

8,265

2007

12.00

4,295

23,269

14,318

2008

300.00

7,812

44,692

39,288

2009

0

3,915

22,355

13,548

2010

0

3,606

39,869

20,126

2011

0

5,794

110,021

41,152

2012

0

5,960

71,278

54,065

Source: Swiss Re, Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters, annual surveys, 2003–2012.
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Table 2
Top 20 Worldwide Insurance Losses, 1970–2012
(Losses in millions of 2012 dollars)
Event

Year

Loss ($ millions)

1

Hurricane Katrina

2005

76,254

2

Japan earthquake

2011

35,735

3

Hurricane Sandy

2012

35,000

4

Hurricane Andrew

1992

26,180

5

9/11/2001 attacks

2001

24,349

6

Northridge, CA earthquake

1994

21,685

7

Hurricane Ike

2008

21,585

8

Hurricane Ivan

2004

15,672

9

Thailand floods

2011

15,315

10

New Zealand earthquake

2011

15,315

11

Hurricane Wilma

2005

14,772

12

Hurricane Rita

2005

11,869

13

U.S. Corn Belt drought

2012

11,000

14

Hurricane Charley

2004

9,784

15

Typhoon Mireille

1991

9,517

16

Hurricane Hugo

1989

8,467

17

Chile earthquake

2010

8,421

18

Storm Doria

1990

8,205

19

Storm Lothar

1999

7,994

20

U.S. storms

2011

7,453

Source: Swiss Re, Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters (years 2003 to 2012), http://www.swissre. com/
sigma/.

The manifestation
of catastrophic
terrorism risk
was a public crisis
that presented
an opportunity
to argue that this
form of risk was
somehow different.

What, then, makes terrorism insurance
so special or unique that it requires federal
government intervention? My answer, as a
point of explanation, is two-fold. First, insurance has traditionally covered fortuitous
events such as storms and earthquakes. The
suggestion that public funds should protect
insurers and commercial policyholders from
earthquake risk would be beyond the pale.
The insurance industry and business interests
cannot plausibly lobby for special protections

against risks that insurance has routinely covered in the past. However, the manifestation
of catastrophic terrorism risk was a public
crisis that presented an opportunity to argue
(lobby) effectively that this form of fortuitous
catastrophic risk was somehow different—so
different that it requires federal government
intervention and protection of the insurance
market and certain business interests.
Second, the makeup of policyholders suffering losses from storms and earthquakes,
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Perspective on the Pricing of Terrorism
Risk
According to a recent report by the insurance broker Marsh and McLennan, the
take-up rate of terrorism risk coverage has
increased over time. In 2003, the rate was
27 percent, and it increased to 61 percent by
2009. Table 3 shows the leading industries
in terms of take-up rate in 2009.53 A vast
majority of Marsh’s clients purchased terrorism coverage, and the demand for terrorism coverage has been robust.
On pricing, the cost of terrorism insurance has fallen gradually over the years, with
a more significant drop in 2009. The median
premium rate for terrorism coverage was
down from $37 per $1 million in coverage in
2008 to $25 per $1 million in 2009.54 During
2008, the median terrorism premium was
$9,541 for a median total insured value (TIV)
of $303 million, which is $0.0000315 of premium for every dollar of TIV. More intuitively, this price level says that $1 of premium
in 2008 purchased coverage for $31,758 of
property. Compare this median price level
for terrorism premium to the median property premium for the same period. The me-

as opposed to terrorism, is different. Those
exposed to natural catastrophes are diffuse
across a broad spectrum of society, from
individual persons to multinational businesses. The victims of the typical hurricane
or earthquake are largely individuals. Only
a portion of policyholders in terms of numbers and potential losses are business enterprises. On the other hand, absent a nuclear,
chemical, or biological attack targeted at a
major civilian center, catastrophic terrorism
risk disproportionately affects commercial
policyholders. Although there were heavy
human casualties from 9/11, much of the
insured losses were losses of tangible assets,
such as planes and buildings, and losses
from business interruption. TRIA is a mandatory program for commercial property
and casualty insurers.52 Catastrophic terrorism, from an insurance perspective, affects
business interests.
These two reasons have little to do with
the nature or the insurability of terrorism
risk as a fortuitous event, but instead the
root of the program is found in the political interest groups seeking to leverage public
funds for their benefit.

Table 3
Industry Terrorism Insurance Take-up Rate (2009)
Industry

Rate (%)

Utilities

80

Real estate

76

Health care

76

Transportation

75

Financial institutions

74

Media

71

Hospitality

68

Education

65

Technology

61

Public entities

61

Source: Marsh and McLennan, The Marsh Report: Terrorism Risk Insurance, 2010, pp. 10–11.
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The cost of
terrorism
insurance has
fallen gradually
over the years,
with a more
significant drop
in 2009.

Why should
the price for
terrorism risk
coverage be kept
artificially low
by government
subsidization of
risk in the first
place instead of
being allowed to
be controlled by
market prices?

dian property premium was $295,755 for a
TIV of $303 million, which is $0.000967 of
premium for every dollar of TIV, or $1 of
premium purchased coverage for $1,024 of
property. This is a ratio of 1:31 between terrorism coverage and property coverage.
These figures show that risks to property
from other sources are far greater than the
risk of terrorism as implied by insurance
prices. The skeptic may argue that the price
for terrorism coverage is artificially low because of TRIA, and that if there were no
TRIA these premium levels would increase
dramatically. There are two problems with
this argument. The first is, why should the
price for terrorism risk coverage be kept artificially low by government subsidization
of risk in the first place instead of being
allowed to be controlled by market prices?
The response that market prices would be
exorbitantly expensive for the private sector
cannot be the answer. As a matter of principle, the cost of the lower price is externalized
to the public. As a practical matter, even if
prices dramatically increase once TRIA sunsets, terrorism coverage relative to property
coverage would still be a tiny fraction of the
overall cost of obtaining property and casualty coverage for an insurable asset—meaning that policyholders can readily afford
much more expensive terrorism coverage.
Suppose, for example, terrorism risk coverage quadruples. Based on the above 2008
figures, policyholders are still looking at $1
of premium for every $7,940 of TIV. This is a
ratio of 1:8 between terrorism coverage and
property coverage.
Lastly, Marsh reported that the standalone market for terrorism risk coverage, including coverage for noncertified risks and
international locations (risks that are not
covered by TRIA), is significant. As of 2010,
the insurance capacity in this market stood
at $3.76 billion.55 The capacity supporting
TRIA-covered risk would be much greater.
The existence of a robust standalone market for non-TRIA coverage for terrorism is
direct evidence that the insurance industry
has the capital and thus the capability of

providing coverage outside of TRIA. If TRIA
is removed from the equation, there would
be much more insurance capacity that can
be attributed to the coverage of terrorism
risk.
Terrorism coverage, without TRIA, would
still be a small portion of the property and
casualty premium and would still be affordable (capable of purchase) by commercial
policyholders. The whole debate on TRIA
and the lobbying effort by the insurance
industry and certain business interests concerns the desire to reduce the cost of coverage and the risk of a catastrophic loss by externalizing this risk to the public fisc.

Externalization of Risk
and Cost
The 9/11 attacks showed that the old
pricing of terrorism risk was wrong. The experience is now engraved in actuarial databanks, and it will be the frame of reference by
which terrorism risk is assessed and priced.
Without TRIA, market forces would have
worked themselves into a new equilibrium:
premiums would have risen with reduced
coverage, the market would have eventually found a new equilibrium upon a more
rational assessment of the risks, and there
would have been more concentrated risk
on the insurance industry and commercial
policyholders. A dire prediction that coverage would disappear would not be based on
market reality.
The insurance industry’s financial recovery from the losses of 9/11 is noteworthy. In
the months after the attacks, insurance stock
prices increased as investors sought to capitalize on anticipated hardening prices and higher
returns on capital.56 The industry quickly recapitalized, and in a few short years held more
capital than it did before 9/11.57 Between 2002
and 2006, surplus in the property and casualty
industry grew from $302 billion to $508 billion. 58 In the years following the attacks, industry return on equity has exceeded that of
the U.S. industry composite.59 With replenished
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capital and underwriting opportunity in a
new risk, insurers would most likely have been
forced to underwrite more coverage even without TRIA, lest the new capital held by insurers
not generate returns to shareholders. As the
pressure to deploy the new capital builds, the
market forces of price, supply, and demand
take over, and a gradual decrease in premium
pricing is inevitable as the bargaining power
between supplier and purchaser shifts. Currently, there is an oversupply of capacity in the
reinsurance market for terrorism risk, which
will put downward pressure on pricing.60
In addition to market stabilization (which
has long been achieved), the purpose of TRIA
was to allow time for the private market to
devise a long-term solution to the problem
of catastrophic terrorism risk. However, the
government has found “little development
or movement among insurers or reinsurers
toward developing a private-sector mechanism that could provide capacity, without
government involvement, to absorb losses
from terrorist events.”61 The industry’s longterm solution appears to be lobbying for an
extension of TRIA or “a long-term, publicprivate partnership.”62
There has always been a significant lobbying effort by groups arguing for such an
extension. On the opposite side of the effort,
an array of consumer groups, public think
tanks, and scholars from the finance, economic, insurance, and legal fields have argued against providing a permanent government subsidy to an insurance industry that
is well capitalized and financially healthy.63
From the insurer’s perspective, there is every
reason to continue TRIA since the provision
of free capital is always a good thing. Lobbying efforts by both the insurance industry
and the business community resulted in extensions of the program in 2005 and again
in 2007. There is no reason to believe that
the same incentives will not come to bear in
2014. Although TRIA was enacted “to allow
for a transition period for the private markets to stabilize,” the program has gone from
a temporary program (originally envisioned
for three years) to a long-term, public-private

cost-sharing arrangement (12 years). There
is nothing to suggest that the insurance industry, now or in the future, will shun free
reinsurance coverage for extreme risk.
Effect of Subsidized Insurance on the
Market
The involvement of the government presents significant questions of fairness and
efficiency.64 The advantages of government
involvement are apparent. After the market
dislocations in the immediate aftermath of
9/11, the take-up rate of terrorism coverage
has gone up.65 Although the amendments
to TRIA imposed a greater share of financial
responsibility on insurers and policyholders, the pricing continued to decline. This
indicates that “competition has held down
premium increases.”66
Competition for business increases as
the industry holds more capital. Insurance
is a cyclical business, with price levels ebbing
and flowing with the supply of capital. Since
9/11, capital has flowed into the insurance
industry. With a greater supply of capital,
insurers will feel a need to provide terrorism risk coverage, whether or not there is a
government backstop. The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) has concluded, “In the
absence of a federal mandate, insurers have
a strong incentive to offer terrorism coverage to their commercial customers because
to do otherwise risks their losing business
on other property and casualty line.”67 They
would lose business because there would be
a competitor who would provide terrorism
coverage to gain another insurer’s customer.
Thus, there might be a sufficient availability
of terrorism coverage even without TRIA.68
Because much of the extreme risk is borne
by the government under the program, insurers can underwrite terrorism with the
knowledge that an act of terrorism will most
likely not cause insolvency or otherwise
threaten the existence of the firm. Indeed,
some scholars have suggested that because
TRIA provides cost-free coverage, the insurance industry has been taking on a much
higher degree of concentration of terrorism
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Currently, there
is an oversupply
of capacity in
the reinsurance
market for
terrorism risk,
which will put
downward
pressure on
pricing.

risk as compared to other catastrophic risks.
If manifested, that terrorism risk would be
off-loaded to the public.69 Given the relative rarity of terrorism on American soil (no
less catastrophic terrorism) and the more
remote possibility given the added security
measures in a post-9/11 world, the provision of terrorism coverage is a highly profitable venture. In years 2002 to 2004 alone,
estimates of terrorism risk premiums were
$700 million, $2.3 billion, and $2.7 billion,
respectively.70 These premiums do not make
up for the losses from 9/11, but over the
course of several more years, without further claims, the losses would be recovered.
At this point, a dozen years after the attacks,
it is a safe guess that the insurance industry
has made back, or even exceeded, its losses
from 9/11.
In sum, since 9/11, premiums for terrorism coverage have declined and the take-up
rate of terrorism coverage has increased.
TRIA had a significant effect. The program
mandates that insurers “make available”
terrorism coverage, and the existence of the
federal backstop assures that premiums are
no different from that of other coverages.
This structure has substantially benefited
the insurance industry. Terrorism risk coverage has provided substantial underwriting
profit, which would also result in substantial
investment profits.

Government
subsidized
insurance has
a net negative
effect in terms
of fairness and
efficiency.

ism. Although 9/11 was catastrophic, the insurance industry absorbed the losses.72 As of
2007, the net worth of insurers writing commercial lines covered by TRIA was about
$187 billion, sufficient to cover a $100 billion total exposure under the program.73 A
$100 billion hit to capital from a terrorist
attack several multiples greater than 9/11
would be devastating, but such an event
would not result in a systemic failure of the
insurance industry,74 which should be the
benchmark for determining whether governmental intervention is warranted or not.
If the private sector of insurers and commercial policyholders can absorb a multibillion dollar loss, the only justification for
government intervention is to shift the cost
from businesses and insurers to American
taxpayers. This raises problems of fairness
and efficiency.
As to fairness, there is no reason why
American taxpayers should partially fund
the cost of business activity when there is no
net social gain from such subsidization. The
direct benefits inure to the insurance industry and its policyholders, and any public gain
is indirect in the form of a dampened shock
to the economy with the ex ante guarantee
of federal funds. Subsidization does not reduce the overall level of losses expected from
terrorist acts; that is, terrorists would not
be deterred because there exists some costshifting mechanism; the cost of terrorism
must be borne by the insurer, policyholder,
or American taxpayer. Given that reality, one
must ask why the American taxpayer should
subsidize the cost of business activity when
the insurers and policyholders are capable of
assuming the costs, though the costs could
be unpleasant under some scenarios.
As far as efficiency, there is substantial
evidence to suggest that TRIA’s enactment is
not cost neutral, that is, the program affects
the total amount of the anticipated cost of
terrorism. If an activity does not fully internalize its cost, the externalization of some
of the cost results in inefficient behavior. A
tangible example can be given: Assume that
a commercial developer has a choice of two

Problem of Subsidized Risk
Government subsidized insurance has a
net negative effect in terms of fairness and
efficiency. The CBO has concluded, “TRIA
does not lower the total costs of terrorism risk, but rather shifts more of the burden from commercial property owners and
their tenants to taxpayers.”71 The program
does not have a cost-reducing effect, which
would result in a net benefit for society, but
it shifts some of the cost of the activities of
well-funded, profitable industries such as insurance, commercial real estate, and finance
to the public.
The insurance industry and the business
community can bear the full cost of terror-
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architectural designs: Design A is a state-ofthe-art glass office tower structure, which is
highly susceptible to an attack from a truck
bomb; Design B is a more generic structure
made of concrete and reinforced steel. Or,
consider a choice of location: Location A is a
highly desirable urban location that is dense
with high-value properties; Location B is a
suburban location that is low-risk for a terrorism strike. If the cost of procuring terrorism coverage is risk-based and fully incorporates the choice of design, the commercial
developer must consider the added cost of
insurance associated with Design A and Location A. On the other hand, if some of the
insurance cost is subsidized by a third party,
then the reduction in cost adversely factors
into the developer’s choice of architectural
design and location. In these everyday choices, businesses can opt to avoid or mitigate
risks, though such avoidance or mitigation
may result in costs such as loss of aesthetics,
convenience, or financial costs. The more
risky choice increases the cost of terrorism,
and yet a subsidized insurance program may
actually incentivize risky behavior, thus increasing overall cost.
These examples illustrate a fundamental
problem of government insurance subsidies.75 More importantly, it is not an abstract
hypothetical. There is evidence that the effect described above is taking hold in the
market. Again, the CBO has noted that “an
abundance of evidence suggests that commercial policyholders as a group are not
taking significant steps to avoid or mitigate
terrorism risks associated with their existing
properties.”76 In addition to a failure to avoid
or mitigate risk, there is evidence of undesirable risk taking. The CBO has also noted that
“TRIA’s subsidies also appear to dampen the
inclination of firms to relocate their operations away from high-risk areas,” thus reducing the risk of exposure.77 Compounding
this problem is the fact that as a result of subsidized insurance “policyholders generally do
not receive explicit discounts on their terrorism insurance premiums for taking specific
mitigation steps.”78 There is substantial rea-

son to believe, based on policy analysis and
empirical observation, that TRIA ultimately
increases the cost of terrorism.79
A corporate welfare program like TRIA
promotes subsidy-seeking behavior from
interest groups. Consider for example this
passage written by an insurance company:
Detractors of the federal government’s continued involvement in terrorism insurance are quick to point
out that the insurance marketplace
has increased surpluses to a level that
should be able to deal with future
terrorism losses. This argument, however, takes little account of the pressures faced throughout the commercial property and casualty insurance
industry as a result of heightened
catastrophic losses—such as a number
of significant earthquakes in the first
half of 2010 and a predicted aboveaverage Atlantic hurricane season for
2010. Such conditions, based on a
number of estimates, are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In
fact, after a relatively benign 2009, the
first half of 2010 has seen an above
average number of significant catastrophic events.80
One could respond to the above argument
with the quip, “So what?” The argument
shows an inappropriate sense of entitlement
to profit, and is irrelevant to whether a subsidy should be provided or not. The business
of insurance companies is to price the cost
of risk transfer and, like all private enterprises, to take risk. If anticipated natural catastrophic risk and losses are high, the industry
must respond according to market pressures,
which may be to withdraw from the market,
raise prices, or pursue some other strategy
in the competitive dynamics of an industry.
The fact that the industry is exposed to catastrophic losses is simply a statement that insurers are in the business of assuming risk. It
is no reason for the federal government to assume the extreme portion of the risk.
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The fact that
the industry is
exposed to
catastrophic
losses is simply
a statement that
insurers are in
the business of
assuming risk.

The public’s
concern is not
the preservation
or guarantee of
the profits of
the insurance
industry or its
policyholders,
but the systemic
failure of the
economic system.

Even without TRIA, terrorism coverage
would be available in the market. Such insurance may and probably would be more
expensive without a federal reinsurance program, but the cost is a matter that would
be allocated between the two principal
private market actors: the insurer and the
policyholder. As between them, the cost is
zero-sum: the policyholder would pay more
premiums, but eventually the insurer may
end up having paid a greater cost. The cost
is fully borne by the activity, and if the cost
is deemed too high such that the activity is
forgone, it is reasonable to conclude that
the activity, on the whole, should not be
initiated, which would be the result under
a fully internalized cost structure. As seen,
however, the program provides government
subsidy of extreme risk. When an activity
does not fully internalize its cost and some
cost is externalized, there is an adverse effect. A greater total cost may result, though
much of this is dispersed to a greater number of cost bearers (i.e., American taxpayers)
in a way that the original risk bearers (i.e.,
insurers and policyholders) profit from the
subsidization. This scheme would then raise
substantial issues of fairness.
In 2014 the government will once again
have the opportunity to weigh these considerations. One option would be to eliminate
TRIA altogether, which is the clearly preferred
option in light of the additional information
and experience gained since the smoldering, dark days immediately after 9/11. Even
without TRIA, the insurance industry is capable of underwriting terrorism risk. After
9/11 the surplus of the property and casualty insurers dropped to an estimated $302
billion.81 By 2009 the surplus reached $556
billion. As the President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets (a joint agency group
comprised of officials from the Treasury,
Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange
Commission, and Commodities Futures
Trading Commission) concluded in 2010,
“this surplus should facilitate the provision
of terrorism coverage.”82 Furthermore, there
is now an over-supply of reinsurance capac-

ity for terrorism coverage, which would tend
to reduce premiums.
If TRIA is extended again by Congress in
response to the insurance lobby, another option for reform of the program could be to
incorporate an ex ante premium. The CBO
has calculated that premiums for the reinsurance program, if charged, would have
had a value of approximately $850 million in
2006 and 2007, respectively.83 It is odd that
the government has chosen not to charge
those premiums, which further suggests
that TRIA is a corporate welfare program.84
Another option, which is not exclusive of
the collection of premium, could be to dramatically raise the trigger amount to the level
of loss that would in fact cause a systemic failure of the insurance market. Presumably, this
trigger would be far greater than the current
trigger of $100 million—perhaps by 2014 the
trigger amount would be on the order of $50
billion or more. The public’s concern is not
the preservation or guarantee of the profits
of the insurance industry or its policyholders, but the systemic failure of the economic
system. The effects, whether positive or negative, of a private contractual arrangement between two sophisticated parties should not
concern the American public or the government. If there is a loss or higher cost among
them, they should assume that effect as part
of doing their business. It is only when their
activity affects third parties, who are not parties to the contract and have not or cannot
negotiate for the disposition of such effects
(as would be the case in a systemic failure of
the insurance industry), does the matter rise
to one of public concern. Such failure would
adversely affect everyone. In this regard, the
trigger amount should reflect the level of loss
that would endanger an entire industry as
opposed to inflicting losses on the industry
or endangering a few insurers or policyholders who ex post may have made bad choices.
From this perspective, a $100 million trigger
is really a small amount. The history of natural catastrophes, particularly in the 1990s
and the new millennium, shows that multibillion dollar losses are now quite routine.
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Conclusion
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American Security in the 21st Century, 1999, p. 4,
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/nwc.htm.
(“Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.”)

The subsidization of terrorism risk for
the insurance industry and commercial policyholders is a form of corporate welfare. It is
not needed. After more than a decade since
9/11, the insurance market has had time to
amply recover from its losses. After the fears
of the unknown have subsided, it can more
rationally assess terrorism risk and price it.
There may have once been a legitimate reason for a truly “temporary” stabilization
measure, but there is no rationale for that
measure to become a permanent federal subsidy of the insurance industry. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 should sunset as scheduled at the end of 2014.
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